Corporate Demand for Insurance: Empirical Evidence from Germany by Krummaker, S.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Krummaker, S. ORCID: 0000-0003-2471-8175 (2016). Corporate Demand for 
Insurance: Empirical Evidence from Germany. . 
This is the draft version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24066/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 
1 
CORPORATE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 
 
 
Simone Krummaker 
Cass Business School | City, University of London 
Faculty of Actuarial Science and Insurance, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, United Kingdom  
 
 
Working Paper, 2016 
A previous version of this study has been published as: 
Krummaker, S. and Schulenburg, J.-M. Graf von der (2008): Die Versicherungsnachfrage von Unternehmen: Eine 
Empirische Untersuchung der Sachversicherungsnachfrage deutscher Unternehmen; Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Versicherungswissenschaft, No. 97, pp.79–97, DOI 10.1007/s12297-008-0004-z  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Several studies have tested theoretical arguments for corporate insurance purchasing behaviour with mixed evidence. 
Additionally, there are rarely studies focussing on European markets even though these belong to the largest markets 
for commercial insurance and reinsurance. This paper presents the first empirical analysis on the property insurance 
demand in Germany using a dataset of 2160 companies. The analysis suggests that the demand for insurance is 
influenced by the firm’s size and its ownership structure. Additionally, higher premium payments lead to a lower 
demand for insurance whereas the number of insurance contracts is positively associated with the insurance demand. 
No clear evidence was found for the loss-ration or the number of losses. This study also sheds light on the importance 
of the supply side and the design of the insurance contract for the demand of insurance. 
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1 Introduction 
Firm’s demand for insurance so far cannot be derived from a coherent theoretical approach. 
Additionally, the concept of risk aversion as a fundament for individual decision making and 
insurance demand cannot be transferred on organisations. Since the 1980s several researchers have 
derived theoretical factors explaining corporate risk management and insurance demanding 
behaviour (e.g. Main, 1982; Main, 1983; Mayers and Smith, 1982; Mayers and Smith, 1987; 
MacMinn, 1987; Stulz, 1984; Skogh, 1989). According to their research, the corporate demand for 
insurance can be derived from information asymmetries and agency conflicts, transaction and 
insolvency costs, tax optimisation strategies, the regulatory background of the company, efficient 
allocation of risk and the insurer’s comparative advantage in risk and loss related services. 
 
Following the development of theoretical factors, since the 1990s several studies have analysed the 
corporate demand for insurance empirically, focussing on insurance markets in the United States 
(Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 1997; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Browne and 
Hoyt, 2000; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008; Michel-Kerjan, Raschky 
and Kunreuther, 2014), Canada (Core, 1997), Japan (Yamori, 1999), China (Zou, Adams and 
Buckle, 2003) and Korea (Regan and Hur, 2007). Surprisingly studies from Europe are missing 
although it is one of the most important and largest insurance markets.1 As a single market the 
German insurance market is one of the largest in Europe as well as worldwide (OECD 2012). 
Focussing on commercial insurance supply, Germany plays a dominant role as a large number of 
commercial insurance companies and some of the biggest reinsurance companies are located there. 
Germany is the world’s second largest market for non-life insurance (OECD 2012) and the demand 
for corporate insurance is a very important factor for German insurance companies considering 
that ca. 47 percent of the German property insurance premiums written in 2011 were paid by firms 
(GDV 2012).2 The lack of empirical studies for Europe and Germany in particular might be due to 
very limited data availability, as companies usually are not obliged to disclose insurance coverage 
data.  
 
1 Exemptions are Thomann and Schulenburg (2006) analysing the German market for terrorism insurance and Reißaus 
(2006) focusing on reinsurance 
2 The proportion of premiums paid by companies for property insurance remained relatively stable in the last years. 
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A series of empirical studies has aimed at finding evidence to support the theories on corporate 
insurance demand. Until now only very studies have focused on European insurance markets 
(Thomann and Schulenburg, 2006 and Reißaus, 2006), even though here are some of the largest 
insurance markets for commercial insurance in the world. This study therefore aims at testing the 
theories on the German market to be able to add empirical evidence to the theories developed. 
 
This paper examines firm’s demand for property insurance in Germany by analysing a data set 
provided by a German commercial insurance company. The findings from this study show the 
impact of company size on the insurance demand. It can also be observed that publicly listed 
companies demand less insurance than companies with other legal forms. Another important result 
is that the premiums paid by companies have a negative relationship to the insurance demand, 
suggesting, that companies adjust their level of insurance coverage subject to the amount of 
premiums paid. Furthermore, this study also provides evidence that the existing approaches on 
firms’ insurance demand might have a gap regarding the supply side of the insurance market. So 
far I am only aware of one paper explicitly taking the supply side into account (Michel-Kerjan, 
Raschky and Kunreuther, 2014). 
 
This paper contributes to corporate risk management literature by adding an empirical study which 
focuses on an important insurance market which the existing literature so far has neglected. 
Additionally, this study is able to go beyond corporate insurance demand as our sample also 
consists widely of other legal forms than listed corporations. The study also broadens the literature 
on the firms’ insurance demand as some new factors, such as the premiums, show an impact. The 
paper further benefits from the unique company dataset, as I was able to access from a large 
German insurance company regarding property insurance contracts with more than 2100 
companies in the sample. 
 
In this article I firstly will review the existing literature and theory before the hypotheses regarding 
corporate insurance demand are developed that are guiding the empirical analysis. In next step I 
present the data and sample I was able to obtain and the used variables in order to test the 
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developed hypotheses. On this basis the results are conducted and then discussed. The paper ends 
with a conclusion and an outlook on further research. 
 
2 Corporate Risk Management and Insurance Demand 
According to modern financial theories and theories of the firm a company’s risk management 
behaviour follows the risk preferences of the owners as they bear the firm’s risk (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Assuming perfect markets they are able to hold a well-
diversified portfolio, which eliminates the insurable risk (Mayers and Smith, 1982 p. 282). As a 
consequence, risk management and the purchase of insurance contracts are not consistent with the 
owners’ interest, as e.g. paying insurance premiums reduces their revenues. But leaving the 
assumption of perfect markets, the existence of risk is costly for a company resulting in 
comprehensive demand for insurance. Several theories have been developed to explain firm 
insurance purchasing behaviour, starting with Mayers’ and Smith’s seminal paper in 1982. 
Moreover, insurance can also be seen as a means of financing. Transferring insurable risks to an 
insurance company releases financial resources to cover other entrepreneurial or market risks 
which cannot easily be mitigated or transferred. 
 
The following paragraphs give an overview over the theories utilized to explain what influences the 
demand for insurance of firms and empirical findings. 
 
Risk shifting and transaction costs 
Broadly discussed motives for firm’s insurance demand can be found in risk shifting and 
transaction costs. Risk shifting is discussed in connection with the legal form resp. ownership 
structure of the company. Managerial discretion differs over various legal forms of companies. The 
legal form in general determines the ownership structure of the firm. Mayers and Smith (1988) 
exemplify three important functions of the ownership structure: (1) the managerial function: 
managers as decision makers, (2) the ownership and risk bearing function: the owner provides 
capital and claims to the risky income stream of the firm, (3) the customer function: the customer 
pays for a service or product and expects to receive an equivalent. 
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The ownership structure, the diversification of owners and stakeholders and the connected risk 
shift is relevant for the insurance demand. In individual enterprises such as sole proprietorships 
the relevant decision maker typically is also the owner, the owner bears risk also with his personal 
wealth. In this case it can be assumed that the insurance purchasing behaviour can sufficiently be 
explained by risk aversion (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Doherty and Smith, 1993). In contrast to 
publicly traded firms individual enterprises buy more insurance than stock corporations where the 
owner only bears risk according to the amount of his share. 
 
Considering all empirical tests on the ownership structure, mixed results can be stated. There are 
both, studies indicating to an influence of the ownership structure on corporate insurance demand 
(e.g. Mayers and Smith, 1999; Regan and Hur, 2007; Cole and McCullough, 2007) and studies 
indicating to no influence or an unclear relationship (Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003; Yamori, 1999). 
 
Hedging or the purchase of insurance can support the reduction of revenue volatility and therefore 
reduce the probability of insolvency (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993) as 
well as the reduction of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, which will also occur if the company 
is rescued after solvency problems. (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Main, 1982). Besides the direct costs, 
such as legal and administrative fees, a company always faces indirect costs of a potential 
insolvency. These include for example the loss of reputation and following this also of market share 
or financing sources, increasing financing costs and risk premiums by investors or potential 
managers. Additionally, indirect costs of a financially stressed company might lead to or worsen 
agency conflicts (Warner, 1977; Grillet, 1992; Doherty and Smith, 1993). The transaction costs of 
bankruptcy are expected to be less than proportional to firm size, thus, small firms bear a greater 
amount of these costs. Therefore, they benefit more from demanding insurance in order to reduce 
the probability of incurring these costs than larger firms (Mayers and Smith, 1992). This hypothesis 
is also supported empirically by e.g. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) or Core (1997) whereas Hoyt 
and Khang (2000) had mixed results.  
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Under the existence of transaction cost it is efficient to allocate risks to those stakeholders of a 
company who have a comparative advantage in risk bearing. In contrast to equityholders and 
debtholders stakeholders as employees, managers or suppliers are not able to diversify risks and 
for this reason they take the level of uncertainty of their payments into account. Shifting the risk 
bearing to claimholders of debt and equity is less costly but limited by the capital stock of the 
company (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 2005). Insurance enables 
the company to transfer risk to the insurer which leads to an efficient risk allocation (Eeckhoudt, 
Gollier and Schlesinger, 2005). Furthermore, the reduction of the potential risk premium of 
stakeholders may cover the loading fees of the insurance contract. As a result and according to 
Mayers and Smith (1982) it is expected that companies with a higher proportion of risk averse 
stakeholders to the company’s outcome, will demand more insurance. 
 
Moreover, insurance companies have comparative advantages in evaluation risks, loss prevention 
and processing claims. Companies with insurance contracts can benefit from these insurers 
activities and services which are connected with the transfer of an insurable risk. Beyond risk 
transfer, one of the main reasons to buy insurance is to take advantage from the insurer’s real 
services (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Doherty and Smith, 1993; Doherty, 2000).This expertise 
provides more motivation to smaller than larger companies since they have less resources and 
experience in risk management. 
 
The argument, that size plays an important role for the demand of company’s insurance demand 
due to bankruptcy cost and insurers services was tested by several studies. The reasons for this 
behaviour might be also driven by better diversification opportunities e.g in terms of geographical 
diversification or different lines of business, or more developed internal risk management processes 
for larger firms. Additionally, larger companies might find easier access to finance from diverse 
sources and could also easier organise self-insurance or generate internal funds. Furthermore, real 
services from insurance companies seem to be even more beneficial for smaller firms (Doherty, 
2000; Hau, 2006). Although contradicting results are found by two studies (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; 
Regan and Hur, 2007) and Core (1997) finds that company size does not influence the purchasing 
behaviour for D&O insurance in Canada, most other empirical studies have found that larger 
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companies demand less insurance than small companies (e.g. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Yamori, 
1999; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Michel-
Kerjan, Raschky and Kunreuther, 2014). Hoyt and Khang (2000) additionally have found empirical 
evidence that the services of an insurance company which are connected to the risk transfer drive 
the demand for insurance. But other studies have not found this influence or have not tested it. 
 
Agency conflicts 
Another main motive for firm’s insurance demand can be explained with agency theory. Two main 
agency conflicts are discovered in a firms’ environment: the conflict of interest between owners 
and managers and the conflict between interests of debtholders and equityholders. Conflicts 
between equityholders such as shareholders and debtholders, e.g. banks or bondholders, in 
leveraged firms lead to problems such as the underinvestment problem or asset substitution. Under 
the risk of insolvency situations might arise, where equityholders are interested in increasing the 
risk of the firm in order to increase the value of the equity on the expense of the debtholders. On 
the other hand side the benefits of value increasing investments in this situation mostly accrue to 
the debtholders the shareholders might not be interested in undertaking these investments as they 
have to bear the risks (Myers, 1977; Mayers and Smith, 1987). The purchase of insurance is more 
likely for firms with higher leverage in order to alleviate these conflicts (Myers, 1977; Mayers and 
Smith, 1982; Mayers and Smith, 1987). 
 
The conflict between owners and managers arises out of the different risk preferences resp. out of 
the fact that on the one hand side the corporate owners (as shareholders) are able to eliminate firm 
specific risk by diversification and therefore they are not interested in the firm’s risk management. 
On the other hand side, the manager’s human capital is limited to diversification; his/her wealth is 
connected with the company’s success. That is why managers are interested in risk management 
and insurance demand (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, it is expected that companies with 
greater managerial discretion will purchase more insurance contracts as managers can use this to 
protect their own wealth and sphere. 
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There is one study giving empirical support for this theory (Hoyt and Khang, 2000). Zou, Adams 
and Buckle (2003) as well as Core (2007) found data indicating to the influence of managerial risk 
aversion on the demand for insurance. But most tests fail due to unavailable or improper data.  
 
Regulation and Taxes 
Mayers and Smith (1982) state that the regulation of industries has an influence on the demand for 
corporate insurance, as regulated companies are able to shift premiums resp. loadings on premiums 
from the firm’s owners to customers. Therefore, regulated companies would purchase more 
insurance than unregulated firms (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Contrarily, it can also be stated that 
companies in regulated industries exhibit a lower insolvency probability as legal requirements and 
monitoring would lead to a better solvency situation (e.g. Grillet, 1992). Therefore, the effect of 
insurance in lowering bankruptcy costs is smaller, hence decreasing the motivation to demand 
insurance. Both effects are supported empirically as Core (1997), Yamori (1999) and Regan and 
Hur (2007) found a positive influence of regulation on insurance demand whereas Hoyt and Khang 
(2000) found a negative relationship. 
 
Under the condition of a convex tax function and limited loss carry forwards, the purchase of 
insurance can reduce the expected tax liability. On the one hand side, insurance premiums are 
deductible business expenses and on the other hand side the annual fluctuation of profits and 
therefore tax liabilities can be smoothened by replacing property or liability losses with insurance 
premiums (Mayers and Smith, 1982; MacMinn, 1987). Hoyt and Khang (2000) as well as Regan 
and Hur (2007) found empirical evidence for this influence of taxes on the demand for insurance. 
Other studies did not find this influence or could not test it (Yamori, 1999). 
 
3 Data Description and Variables 
Public information regarding the corporate demand for insurance is not available for Germany 
companies as these are not obliged to disclose insurance related data. Instead, the data for this 
study were provided by a large German insurance company with a long tradition in commercial 
insurance. The dataset covers German companies insured with this insurer in the years 2004 and 
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2005 and includes 2160 German companies with 3520 contracts. The insurance contracts covered 
in this sample are property (fire) and all risk insurance and business interruption insurance (all risk 
and fire). Additional data provided are premiums written for the years 2004 and 2005, number and 
amount of losses/indemnities, sums insured, maximum annual compensation and probable 
maximum loss. Moreover, the dataset includes the industrial sector of the company, the legal form, 
the annual turnover and the number of employees. Table 1 shows the industries and number of 
companies in the sample. 
Table 1: Industries and number of companies in the sample 
 
The type of industry is included as indicator variables into the analysis. 
 
  
industry Frequency Percent Cumulative
Automobile retail 1486 68.80 68.80
Other 100 4.63 73.43
Metal 88 4.07 77.50
Engineering 81 3.75 81.25
Wholesale 76 3.52 84.77
Services 62 2.87 87.64
Real Estate 38 1.76 89.40
Food & Textiles 37 1.71 91.11
Retail 23 1.06 92.18
Mining 23 1.06 93.24
Furniture & Wood 22 1.02 94.26
Paper 18 0.83 95.09
Construction 17 0.79 95.88
Chemicals 16 0.74 96.62
Energy & Water 16 0.74 97.36
IT & Software 14 0.65 98.01
Transport 10 0.46 98.47
Insurance 8 0.37 98.84
Automobile 6 0.28 99.12
Health 5 0.23 99.35
Waste, Recycling & Sewage 4 0.19 99.54
Banking 4 0.19 99.72
Hotels & Restaurants 2 0.09 99.81
Petroleum 2 0.09 99.91
Agriculture 2 0.09 100.00
Total 2160 100
 
10 
Insurance Demand 
In this paper I aim at discovering determinants which drive firms’ demand for insurance. To 
achieve this, insurance data provided by a specific insurance company are analysed.  
 
The dependant variable “demand of insurance” is derived as degree of coverage purchased with 
the property insurance contract. I follow the approach of Hoyt and Khang (2000) as well as Zou, 
Adams and Buckle (2003) who construct the dependent variable to measure the insurance demand 
in relation to the insurable value of the company. The companies in this study actively decide about 
their annual maximum compensation with regard to the insurance sum. As the total sum insured 
reflects the value of insurable assets and the decision maker in the company negotiates with the 
insurer about the annual maximum compensation, this indicates how much insurance coverage is 
demanded. The insurance demand therefore is derived as “degree of coverage”. The degree of 
coverage is measured as the ratio of the “annual maximum compensation” to the “total sum 
insured” in the property insurance contract. Table 2 shows the summary statistics on the corporate 
demand for insurance.  
Table 2: Corporate demand for insurance 
 
The full sample contains 1486 automobile retailers which are offered a special insurance policy by 
the insurance company with full coverage as default choice (annual maximum compensation = 
total sum insured). As a result all automobile retailers in this sample, except one firm in one 
contract, have chosen full coverage, a degree of coverage of 1.0. Therefore, I have analysed the 
summary statistics for the degree of coverage excluding automobile retailers. We can see that the 
mean of the level of coverage is slightly lower with 84.69 percent. But also here we can state that 
the majority of companies chose full coverage contracts (1561 of 2018 contracts exhibit full 
coverage). 
 
  
degree of coverage Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
all contracts 3520 0.9119 0.2487 0.0034 1
without Automible retailers 2018 0.8469 0.3124 0.0034 1
only Automobile retailers 1502 0.9994 0.0232 0.0997 1
Corporate demand for insurance: degree of coverage = annual maximum compensation / total sum insured
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Size of the company 
Different studies have used different approaches to measure the size of a company. A common 
practice is to use the total assets (e.g. Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Zou et al., 2003; Regan and Hur, 
2007) or market capitalisation (e.g. Yamori 1999). The European Commission suggests defining 
the size of small and medium-sized enterprises by staff headcount, annual turnover or annual 
balance sheet and to meet at least two criteria; staff headcount with annual turnover or annual 
balance sheet (European Commission 2003). Additionally, press rankings of firms are also using 
annual turnover to determine the size of a firm, so for example the German Handelsblatt ranking 
of the 500 largest European companies (Sommer 2009).  
 
In this study I follow the European Commission (2003), as the sample of companies is very diverse 
with respect to the industries they belong to. This means different approaches to measure firm size 
are appropriate for different types of industry. Assets or turnover might be valid for firms in the 
so called “old economy” but is perhaps not appropriate for the service industry. Tangible 
production factors play a secondary role for service firms as human resources are the most 
important factor there. Focussing on financial services such as insurance companies we see that 
size and business results might be measured via capital assets or annual premium income. These 
factors measure business volume and are related to measures like revenues but are hardly 
comparable with other businesses. The number of employees might be a comparable factor to 
approximate firm size as this factor is relatively stable and represents resource input. But 
considering the so called “new economy” the number of employees might be a misleading figure, 
as these firms are able to generate high turnovers with a relatively small amount of input factors. 
Here revenues or turnover might be appropriate criteria to compare firm sizes.  
 
As annual turnover and the number of employees seem to be factors which reflect the size of a 
company over different industries best I will use both in this study. Table 3 gives an overview 
about the size indicators. 
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Table 3: Size of the companies in the sample 
 
As two indicators of size available, turnover and number of employees are available, the variable 
SIZE is created by combining the categories of turnover with the categories of employees (size = 
turnover + employees). This enables the analysis to capture the benefits of both measures. 
 
According to theory discussed earlier I expect that smaller firms insure more than larger firms, 
which implies a negative relationship between firm size and insurance demand.  
 
Ownership structure 
The ownership structure of a company is reflected in its legal form. In this sample the companies 
are distinguished with regard to risk bearing aspect using their legal form. Therefore, all publicly 
traded companies, corporations, stock companies etc. are combined under the term “PUBLIC” (in 
Germany that includes mainly Kapitalgesellschaften such as Aktiengesllschaft/AG, 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien/KGaA). All other forms of limited liability by guarantee 
including limited partnerships etc. are combined as “LIMITED” (this includes German company 
types such as Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung/GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG). Types of 
companies with closely held ownership with a single or very few owners bearing all risks such as 
individual enterprises or sole proprietorships are referred to as “CLOSLEY” (in Germany this 
includes mainly Personengesellschaften e.g. eingetragener Kaufmann , Gewerbetreibende, self-
class turnover Frequency Percent class employees Frequency Percent
1 0 - 250 000 Euro 714 33.06 1 0 to 9 employees 839 38.84
2 251 000 - 500 000 Euro 19 0.88 2 10 to 24 411 19.03
3 501 000  - 750 000 Euro 18 0.83 3 24 to 49 390 18.06
4 751 000 - 1 000 000 Euro 38 1.76 4 50 to 74 149 6.9
5 1 001 000 - 2 000 000 Euro 136 6.3 5 75 to 99 94 4.35
6 2 001 000 - 2 500 000 Euro 55 2.55 6 100 to 249 137 6.34
7 2 501 000 - 5 000 0000 Euro 246 11.39 7 250 to 499 74 3.43
8 5 001 000- 7 500 000 Euro 184 8.52 8 500 to 749 22 1.02
9 7 501 000 - 10 000 000 Euro 145 6.71 9 750 to 999 8 0.37
10 10 001 000 - 20 000 000 Euro 263 12.18 10 more than 1000 36 1.67
11 20 001 000 - 30 000 000 Euro 113 5.23
12 30 001 000 - 40 000 000 Euro 40 1.85 Total 2160 100
13 40 001 000 - 50 001 000 Euro 35 1.62
14 50 001 000 - 100 000 000 Euro 80 3.7
15 100 001 000  - 250 000 000 Euro 38 1.76
16 250 001 000 - 750 000 000 Euro 21 0.97
17 > 750 000 000 Euro 15 0.69
Total 2160 100
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employed, Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts and other small partnerships without limited liability). 
All other types such as cooperatives, associations etc. are combined as “other legal form”. For each 
form a dummy variable, PUBLIC, CLOSELY and LIMITED is created with 1 when legal form is 
true and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4: Ownership structure as legal form of the company 
 
I expect public companies to demand the least amount of insurance as risk bearing is spread over 
a larger number of owners. In contrast sole proprietorships are expected to demand more insurance 
coverage, as the owner bears business risk also with his personal wealth. “LIMITED” is used as 
reference in the regression model. I therefore expect the signs for CLOSELY to be positive as they 
are expected to demand more insurance than companies in limited ownership. For public 
companies the coefficients should be negative as they should demand less insurance than limited 
companies and therefore the degree of coverage should be smaller. Additionally, I hypothesise that 
public companies will show a lower degree of coverage than closely held companies as they can 
spread risk more widely. 
 
Risk bearing 
Following the argumentation of e.g. Mayers and Smith (1982) I hypothesise that companies with a 
higher proportion of risk averse stakeholders to the company’s outcome will demand more 
insurance. As I assume that employees are more risk averse as the owners of a company, I have 
constructed the variable RISKBEARING which reflects the proportion of employees per Euro 
turnover by dividing the classes of employees by the classes of turnover. The value of the variable 
gets larger if more employees account for one Euro of turnover. I therefore expect the sign to be 
positive following the argumentation that a higher proportion of risk averse stakeholder leads to a 
higher demand for insurance. 
 
The following table shows the summary statistics and definition of the variables. 
legal form Frequency Percent
other legal form 54 2.5
public 57 2.64
closely held 536 70.05
limited 1513 24.81
Total 2160 100
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Table 5: Summary Statistics 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
degree_coverage level of coverage
 = annual maximum indemnity / sum insured
3520 0.9119 0.2487 0 1
revenues in Euro, measured in 17 classes 2160 6.2759 4.4642 1 17
employees number of employees, measured in 10 classes 2160 2.7060 2.0558 1 10
size size = turnover + employees 3520 10.3457 7.5183 2 27
legalform public 2160 0.0264 0.1603 0 1
closelyheld 2160 0.2481 0.4320 0 1
l imited 2160 0.7005 0.4582 0 1
ncontract number of insurance contracts
property and liability
2160 1.5907 2.0681 1 47
riskbearing proportion of employees to revenues
 = employees/turnover
2160 0.6240 0.4825 0 10
premiums premium2004 2710 11723.2100 51028.3700 1.36 1148249.00
premium2005 3031 11819.2100 46362.6200 1.60 944676.90
losspayments losspayments2004 3520 6260.2870 239141.2000 0.00 14100000.00
losspayments2005 3520 6182.6390 112937.2000 0.00 4890108.00
nlosses nlosses2004 3520 0.4193 1.3474 0 31
nlosses2005 3520 0.4611 1.7223 0 51
lossratio lossratio2004 2710 590.9631 22035.0900 0.00 1145222.00
lossratio2005 3031 90.4673 775.2332 0.00 25976.15
sum_insured property insurance sum 3520 84400000 316000000 2556 5800000000
Variable and Description
paid premiums in Euro p.a.
indemnity payments in Euro p.a.
number of losses p.a.
losses in % of premiums paid
dummy variable for ownership structure
1 if true, 0 otherwise
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4 Results and Discussion 
The data for this analysis were provided by a German insurance company. As uninsured companies 
are excluded by the nature of the data information about uninsured firms is not obtainable. The 
sample consist only of insured firms, thus, “degree of coverage” is a limited dependent variable. 
This variable is truncated at the lower level as its value for all companies in our sample is > 0 and 
no information about the whole population is available. I conduct a truncated regression model to 
test the hypotheses concerning the corporate insurance demand (Greene, 2011; Wooldridge, 2006, 
p. 613-615; Baum, 2006, p. 259-262). The results are shown in table 6. 
 
The results of the truncated regression are displayed in two models. Model A analyses the effect of 
company size, ownership structure and the risk bearing variable on the chosen degree of insurance 
coverage as well as control variables for the number of contracts, premiums, losses and loss ratio 
for both of the available years.3 Model B is extended by the indicator variables for the industry type. 
The likelihood-ratio test shows that Model B has a significant higher fit with 𝐿𝑅 𝑐ℎ𝑖2(24) =
197.69, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.0000. 
 
The regression shows the coefficient for the variable SIZE with a negative sign, supporting our 
hypothesised relationship that the demand for insurance decreases with increasing company size. 
This result is robust when the indictor variables for industry into the regression are introduced. 
The findings therefore support theories stating that larger firms on average demand less insurance. 
This is in line with most of other empirical studies and across these studies, results regarding 
company size seem to more often give support to the hypothesis that size is negatively connected 
with insurance demand. But as also contradicting results across different studies and research 
designs appear it is still open which of the size related arguments might drive the insurance demand 
(diversification, access to finance, sophisticated risk management, less dependence on insurer’s real 
services etc.) and more research might shed light on this. 
 
3 The model fit is better when including premiums and losses for both 2004 and 2005, than only 2004. Likelihood-
ratio test LR chi2(4)  = 15.51, Prob > chi2 = 0.0038 
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Table 6: Truncated regression model on corporate insurance demand 
 
The coefficients for the ownership structure variable PUBLIC indicate that publicly traded 
companies demand less insurance coverage than limited companies (the reference category in the 
regression) as the coefficients are negative in both regressions. But when the indicator variables for 
industry are included the coefficient gets highly significant. This result is in line with our assumed 
relationship that publicly listed companies such as stock companies demand less insurance than 
degree_coverage Coef. z Coef. z ***
size -0.00540560 -9.34 *** -0.00376680 -5.82 ***
public -0.01272640 -0.68 -0.07060500 -3.27 ***
closely 0.00985920 1.01 -0.00698720 -0.73
riskbearing -0.05505210 -7.37 *** -0.04575280 -6.20 ***
ncontract 0.00037690 0.56 0.00301790 4.00 ***
premium2004 -0.00000106 -4.61 *** -0.00000085 -4.02 ***
premium2005 -0.00000054 -2.34 * -0.00000051 -2.36 *
losspayment2004 0.00000008 5.72 *** 0.00000003 2.12 *
losspayment2005 -0.00000002 -0.17 0.00000006 0.53
nlosses2004 0.00148470 0.41 -0.00169220 -0.48
nlosses2005 0.00837990 2.63 ** 0.00699290 2.25 *
lossratio2004 0.00000003 0.18 0.00000006 0.38
lossratio2005 0.00000556 0.73 0.00000156 0.21
Automobile_Retail 0.10982830 3.76 ***
Wholesale 0.01765670 0.54
Construction 0.12759790 2.44 *
Engineering 0.02863940 0.89
Mining -0.02272100 -0.57
Chemicals 0.00120090 0.03
Metal 0.02962090 0.94
Paper -0.02956320 -0.75
IT_Software -0.02866000 -0.70
Services 0.01099370 0.33
Energy_Water 0.14941390 3.45 ***
Waste_Recycling_Sewage -0.21507120 -1.94  +
Food_Textiles -0.01499820 -0.42
Hotels_Restaurants 0.11119380 0.83
Petroleum 0.60600160 5.04 ***
Automobile 0.12758150 2.86 **
Transport -0.09516190 -1.65  +
Agriculture 0.21072410 2.90 **
Health 0.00488890 0.07
RealEstate_Property 0.10640980 2.72 **
Insurance 0.16006840 3.01 **
Furniture_Wood -0.02754170 -0.73
Banking 0.16168070 1.83  +
Other 0.07497040 2.06
_cons 1.03873900 105.56 *** 0.94471850 31.47 ***
sigma 0.19245800 72.34 *** 0.18513590 72.32 ***
number of obs 2621 2621
Wald chi2 350.29 616.62
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood 607.33310 706.17612
reference indicator variables : l imited / reta i l    |   s igni ficance levels : 0.001 *** | 0.01 ** | 0.05 * | 0.1 +
A B
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other firm types. The coefficients for closely held firms are positive but not significant. Therefore, 
the result for single enterprises is not so clear. It can be stated that, at least in our sample, public 
liability companies demand less insurance than companies with other legal forms and ownership 
structures. This supports the argument, that the diversification opportunities of the 
owners/shareholders affect the risk bearing capacity and decision making of the company. Other 
empirical studies support this argument as well (e.g Mayers and Smith, 1990 for the insurance 
industry). 
 
But overall, the result for the influence of ownership structure on the demand for insurance is not 
as clear as expected and we cannot find a clear pattern for companies with other legal forms. 
Considering other empirical tests on the ownership structure, results are mixed. There are both, 
studies indicating to an influence of the ownership structure on corporate insurance demand 
(Mayers and Smith, 1999; Regan and Hur, 2007; Cole and McCullough, 2007) and studies indicating 
to no influence or an unclear relationship (e.g Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003; Yamori, 1999). 
Yamori (1999) for example did not find a significant effect of ownership structure and traces this 
back on weak proxies for ownership structures. I could identify the legal form of the companies 
which we perceive as a good indicator of the ownership structure. However, this does not allow to 
see for example whether a stock company is dominated by a majority shareholder or ownership is 
widespread. 
 
The RISKBEARING variable, which measures the proportion of employees to turnover, is highly 
significant over both regression models showing a negative sign. This means that companies where 
more employees account for one Euro of turnover demand less insurance coverage. This is 
contradictory to our hypothesized relationship, where I expected that a larger proportion of risk 
averse stakeholders, in particular employees, would lead to a higher demand for insurance in order 
to take care for their individual risk in the company. In our sample this is not the case. This might 
be due to measuring problems as the variables turnover and employees are only available in 
categories. Additionally, these variables also account for company size. 
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To be able to control for different insurance demanding behaviour across different industries, 
dummy variables for each industry are included. The retail sector serves as reference. The analysis 
shows that industries such as automobile, insurance, energy/water, real estate/property, 
construction, banking and auto retail significantly demand a higher insurance coverage for their 
property insurance. Significantly less insurance coverage is chosen by the transport and the 
waste/recycling, retail, furniture/wood, food/textiles or service industry. From our aggregate point 
of view there is no strong common pattern of industries demanding more resp. less insurance 
coverage. Our findings are partly supported by Thomann and Schulenburg (2006) who find a high 
demand for terrorism insurance coverage within real estate firms and funds as well as insurance 
companies. 
 
Automobile retailers show a significantly higher insurance demand. The sample provides 1486 
automobile dealers which predestines this subsample for a deeper analysis. Car dealers get offered 
a customised and standardised insurance policy from this insurance company, and as result all but 
one car dealers demand full insurance coverage, therefore preventing a meaningful analysis 
regarding the level of insurance demand. 
 
With a view to regulation of different industries there is no clear pattern. In Germany we consider 
the health sector as well as financial services (including banks and insurance companies) as highly 
regulated industries. Other well regulated industries are waste/sewage/recycling, transport or 
energy/water. The regression analysis shows that firms of the financial services as banks and 
insurance companies as well as energy/water and health demand more coverage compared to the 
retail sector, others such as waste/recycling or transport demand less. We therefore can find 
evidence for both arguments: On the one hand side, as regulated industries tend to have a lower 
risk of insolvency they need not to buy as much insurance. On the other hand side as they can 
often pass additional cost for insurance contracts to the customer they do not have incentives to 
lower the insurance demand. Further research in this direction might be useful, as the regulation 
of industries is manifold. Perhaps a more precise distinction between the types and depth of 
regulation might lead to further insights to this question. Additionally, Michel-Kerjan, Raschky and 
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Kunreuther (2014) have argued that the insurance risk premium might already account for 
differences in risk exposure amongst industries and this might be true in our study as well. 
 
The control variables regarding contracts, losses and premiums give also valuable insights. The 
coefficient of the number of contracts (NCONTRACT) a company has with this insurer is positive 
and highly significant in the full regression model. That means that the level of insurance coverage 
is higher the more contracts a company has. The interpretation of this phenomenon might be 
connected with questions of risk averse behaviour of/in companies or of the relationship of a 
company with its main insurer. But so far there is no clear and intuitive explanation out of the 
available data. 
 
Another important driver of the insurance demand are the premiums paid. The higher the 
insurance premiums the lower is the level of insurance coverage. Companies have to balance the 
level of insurance coverage together with the amount of premiums to pay when deciding on an 
insurance contract (see also Michel-Kerjan, Raschky and Kunreuther, 2014). The insured 
companies obviously account for a higher premium by lowering the level of coverage. But the data 
do not allow us to analyse whether this might be also risk related. Furthermore, analysing the 
influence of the number and amount of losses as well as the loss ratio, there is no clear picture. I 
would have expected that companies with a high loss ratio would demand more insurance as they 
benefit more from paying for insurance coverage (see also Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003 or Regan 
and Hur, 2007). But the pure premium payments seem to be a stronger influence factor than the 
cost-effectiveness of an insurance contract. 
 
I am well aware that the sample of companies is biased. On the one hand side there is the 
selection bias as the data were provided by an insurance company and therefore this dataset 
consists only of companies with a positive degree of coverage. I tried to control for this bias by 
choosing the appropriate regression technique in form of the truncated regression analysis. On 
the other hand side, the distribution of industries in our sample is also not representative. A large 
number of firms are automobile retailers, as the insurance company has developed a special 
policy for this business. 69% (1486) of all firms in our sample belong to this group of automobile 
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retailers. The two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that the two samples differ (Ho: 
degree~e(Automo~l==0) = degree~e(Automo~l==1) | z = -21.469 |     Prob > |z| =   
0.0000). To test the robustness of our results I have conducted the analysis without the 
automobile retailers. The results are displayed in table 7. 
Table 7: Truncated regression model on corporate insurance demand without automobile retail 
 
degree_coverage Coef. z
size -0.00451590 -4.08 ***
public -0.07256200 -2.30 *
closely -0.01128500 -0.43
riskbearing -0.06187000 -4.28 ******
ncontract 0.00314460 2.88 **
premium2004 -0.00000091 -2.84 **
premium2005 -0.00000055 -1.70  +
losspayment2004 0.00000004 1.72  +
losspayment2005 0.00000003 0.19
nlosses2004 -0.00792590 -0.99
nlosses2005 0.01249190 1.92  +
lossratio2004 0.00000007 0.28
lossratio2005 0.00000359 0.30
Wholesale 0.02009210 0.42
Construction 0.12950380 1.73  +
Engineering 0.03516430 0.75
Mining -0.01854470 -0.32
Chemicals 0.01038610 0.16
Metal 0.03329950 0.73
Paper -0.02632950 -0.47
IT_Software -0.02751200 -0.47
Services 0.01520470 0.31
Energy_Water 0.15959630 2.57 **
Waste_Recycling_Sewage -0.20930720 -1.30
Food_Textiles -0.00254350 -0.05
Hotels_Restaurants 0.11127580 0.58
Petroleum 0.61291630 3.49 ***
Automobile 0.13784820 2.14 *
Transport -0.08715940 -1.04
Agriculture 0.22492540 2.17 *
Health 0.00987230 0.10
RealEstate_Property 0.10835040 1.93  +
Insurance 0.17029090 2.22 *
Furniture_Wood -0.01982580 -0.36
Banking 0.16725890 1.33
Other 0.07835660 1.49
_cons 0.96009170 21.76 ***
sigma 0.26279970 49.79 ***
number of obs 1295
Wald chi2 181.87
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log likelihood -94.26619
reference indicator variables : l imited / reta i l
s igni ficance levels : 0.001 *** | 0.01 ** | 0.05 * | 0.1 
+
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In general, we can state, that the main results are similar to the previous regression analysis, 
including automobile retailers. Overall, the levels of significance are lower, but the main findings 
are the same. 
 
What we also are able to see from the automobile retailer subsample is that the supply side of 
insurance plays an important role in determining the level of insurance coverage demanded by the 
companies. The insurance company which provided the data offers a standard all risk insurance 
policy with standard insurance sums and maximum annual indemnity payments. This resulted in a 
very high pick up rate of this standard coverage, only one of the 1486 automobile retailers changed 
the standard maximum annual compensation away from full coverage. Hence I suggest that further 
research of the supply side of corporate insurance demand and also of the framing of standard 
insurance offers on the demand of insurance by commercial customers might be insightful. 
 
Some limitations besides the sample selection bias remain. Only insured companies were analysed 
in this study, due to the nature of the data. Therefore, we are unable to observe behaviour of 
uninsured companies. The risk-based premium for insurance coverage is not available as well. If 
large companies have more power on the insurance market, they might be more effective in 
negotiating low premiums per risk. That might be one reason for our result, that large firms buy 
more insurance than small firms. Additionally, the variable to measure company size, turnover and 
employees, were only available in categories. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the corporate insurance demand for German companies 
by using a unique dataset provided by a German insurer containing more than 2100 firms. This 
study contributes to the academic literature mainly in two aspects. First, several studies previously 
analysed the insurance purchasing behaviour of firms but were nearly exclusively based on 
American and Asian data. This paper fills the gap of European and especially German evidence on 
the corporate insurance demand and therefore, broadening the empirical foundation of these 
theories. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on corporate insurance demand by adding 
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evidence for other factors which have an influence on the insurance demand, such as the number 
of insurance contracts or premiums paid. Third, the analysis sheds light on the importance of 
contract design and the supply of insurance. 
 
Conducting a truncated regression analysis, our findings support the assumption that the demand 
for insurance is decreasing with larger company size. There is also evidence that the ownership 
structure, in our sample proxied by the legal form of the company, influences the amount of 
insurance coverage purchased. In our dataset in particular public limited liability companies, such 
as stock corporations, demand significantly less insurance coverage than other company types. 
However, I could not find strong evidence that companies where the owner bears the firm risk 
also with his/her personal wealth, such as sole proprietorships, demand more insurance coverage. 
 
Another interesting result of our study is the influence of the premium paid. I find that a higher 
premium significantly leads to a lower demand for insurance. Even though it can be assumed that 
the premiums are risk adjusted, the companies adjust for higher premiums with a lower insurance 
coverage. The data do not show a clear pattern of insurance demand across different industries. 
Also focussing on regulated industries such as insurance or the energy and water supply sector, a 
clear direction of the influence of regulation or industry type on the demand for insurance cannot 
be found. It might be beneficial, if future research refines the form and depth of regulation to 
analyse its impact on the demand for insurance. 
 
Finally, I can emphasise that the supply side of insurance also plays an important role in 
determining the demand of insurance. A large proportion of our firm sample was offered a 
business-type customised standardised insurance contract. As a result, with one exemption, all 
firms in this business picked up full insurance with standard insurance sums offered. This gives 
support to the influence of behavioural and cognitive aspects such as framing and anchoring. It 
might be therefore beneficial to study the effect of the insurance supply, contract design and 
standardisation also in a corporate insurance environment. 
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In summary, mirroring our results with those of previous empirical studies, some hypotheses are 
supported by some studies while others are not supported. Therefore it can be stated, that overall 
the empirical support of the theories why firms purchase insurance and which factors are 
determining the demand for insurance is mixed. It therefore might be beneficial to conduct 
longitudinal studies or cross-sectional studies with larger and international firm samples. Moreover 
it might be interesting to derive factors influencing the corporate demand for insurance with 
exploratory studies out of an empirical environment as well as include behavioural aspects of the 
decision making in companies with regard to insurance. This might be a chance to derive factors 
or interdependencies with clearer impact for later tests. 
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